The memorandum on April 27 and the polarization of the regime's forces
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The ongoing polarization of the regime's inner forces around the presidential elections reached its peak with a memorandum by the fascist generals on April 27.
In the clashes in Cankaya Palace lasting for months, the AKP 's (Party of Justice and Development-government party) delay to nominate candidates has raised tensions.
The Turkish Army, which had realized three coups so far (May 27, 1960; March 12, 1971 and September 12, 1980) and another "post modern coup" on February 28, 1997, has always claimed to be the only owner and protector of the . Since the AKP is forming the government, there have been some limited changes in the power relation between TÜSIAD and the AKP on the one hand and the army and the forces around it on the other hand. The first ones won some posts against the latter. From every point of view, the presidential elections had the meaning that this power relation, which was established between the regime's forces, was going to be reorganized. The army and its supporting forces judged the nomination of an AKP-president as a possible threat to the ruling power, and as an act which might weaken their posts and might destroy the fundamentals of the regime because of the symbolic value a president has got. The army, the main oppositional party CHP (Republican People's Party) and some other forces following the same line have put a lot of effort in keeping the AKP away from this post. Within this power struggle, the army's sword is called secularism.
These forces which on the one hand try to put pressure on the AKP by using threats, also tried to incite the masses, full of rage against the collaborating policy of the government, against the AKP government by organizing a rally on April 14 in Ankara. They were successful as they made hundreds of thousand people fill the streets.
Finally, the AKP presented its candidate. As soon as the name of Abdullah Gul, one of the top men of the AKP, was mentioned, the discussion on the question "Will there be headscarves in Cankaya from now on?" reached its peak.*
The presidential elections started in the afternoon on April 27. When the majority of 367 votes, which were necessary in the first round, could not be achieved, the elections turned into a ballot crisis: the CHP, which in this clash has been the main spokesman of the army within parliament from the beginning on, submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court, because "a parliament session can only be opened for realizing elections when 367 deputies are present"**. The discussions around the 367 deputies had started weeks ago and the CHP complaint in a written version had been ready for days. This was the only point for them to make use of the law to hinder the AKP, which has the necessary majority of the voices to elect the president.
In the same night at 11.10pm, the General Staff published a memorandum on his homepage and presented his stance: "The problem that occurred during the presidential elections in the last days is now centralized in the discussion on secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are watching this situation with concern. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are partial in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism. The Turkish armed forces are strictly against those debates and any negative comments and will display openly and clearly its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary."
In the declaration, it also said that "the Turkish armed forces keep their ceaseless determination, which they got to fulfil their duties completely, determined by law, in order to protect these qualities. The Turkish armed forces' belief and commitment to this determination are indisputable." This statement resembles the threat of a military coup.
The AKP government, however, continues with its persisting attitude against the memorandum that it had developed from the beginning. It judged the general staff's declaration as an "intervention into the ruling" and explained that this is "unthinkable for democratic societies".
With its declaration, the army's main aim is to influence the Constitutional Court's decision to count the first round of the election held on April 27 as valid or not. In case it is counted as invalid, there will be early elections in the end of July and beginning of August. In the next two months, the General Staff might put effort into splitting and isolating the AKP and undertake steps to prevent the party from being reelected into the government by early elections. This act could also involve the persecution of different Islamic forces around the AKP. With new provocations, the army could try to polarize the working class and the masses of labourers on the basis of secularism and Sharia. However, due to the international conjuncture, the army does not seem to take more serious precautions against the AKP.
The AKP has been a product of the memorandum on February 28, 1997. In that time, after the coalition of the RP (Party of Welfare) and the DYP (True Path Party) had been expelled from the government, the RP liquidated through splitting and the AKP, a "moderate" Islamic party of the type "Project Greater Middle East" was founded. Now, the aim is to keep this party, which was a product of a previous memorandum, but has now extravagated, away from its posts achieved so far.
Whilst the polarization among the regime's inner forces became deeper, attacks on the revolutionary, democratic, progressive forces and the Kurdish people increased, too. Especially the DTP is being oppressed more than usually in order to prevent the party from entering parliament with early elections.
The progressive, revolutionary, communist forces in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan have now the duty to strengthen the united struggle under the slogan "No to putschists".

*Since 28 February 1997, wearing headscarves is no longer permitted in public areas. The headscarf has become the symbol of the polarization between Secularism and Sharia. New discussions came up came up as Abdullah Gul's wife wears a headscarf and so, a possiblity that the headscarf will move to Cankaya palace, which is a symbolic place, has appeared. The wife of the Prime Minister and of the other ministers from AKP has never been invited to receptions in Cankaya.
**The president is elected by the members of National Congress (totally 550 deputies). The presence of 184 deputies is enough for the opening of an ordinary session. However, during the presidential elections, a condition was brought forward that not 184, but 367 deputies, which form the two third of the majority have to be present.

Rallies supporting the putschists

On April 14, a rally was organized at Tandogan Square, Ankara, to support the possible application of Tayyip Erdogan. The country has rarely faced such a mass coming together. Different groups, which present themselves as anti-imperialist and left-wing, but are commonly known for provoking racism and chauvinism, such as the ADD (Association of Kemalist Thought) and the CHP, and civil fascist parties such as the MHP (National Movement Party) and BBP (Party of Great Unity) displayed a mass protest. The number of participants was more than 1 million, whereas these were not the masses of putschist, racist, fascist organizations, but the masses of labourers, who had been full of rage until then against the collaborating policies of the AKP government, its loyal slavery to USA and EU imperialists and Islamic reaction.
This rally had the aim to reduce the legitimacy of the chance that there will be an AKP-president and instead to legitimate precautions such as the memorandum on April 27, which happen whenever the AKP breaks ranks.
The rally was lead by the retired general Eruygur, president of the ADD. It became public that this pasha, follower of the US, was one the fascist generals who had made plans to realize a coup in 2004.
After this rally, which progressive forces considered as a rally supporting the putschists, another rally took place on April 29 in Istanbul and this rally was even bigger.
Two days before the rally on April 29, the memorandum mentioned above was proclaimed. Although the rally was organized under the slogan "No Sharia, no coup, but a full democratic Turkey", and started with the slogan "Long live pasha Yasar", it did not have any other meaning than a rally for the "support of the memorandum message".
The number of participants was higher than in the rally at Tandogan Square, Ankara. The trade union DISK and many other democratic mass organizations, which "officially" had not supported the rally in Ankara, joined the rally in Istanbul and therefore gave themselves the poor role they had already played at the memorandum on February 28, 1997.
Both rallies have been the last examples of the policy of organizing the labourer masses within the context of a reactionary polarization on the basis of the separations such as Turks and Kurds, secularism and islamism or Allevites and Sunnites; of dragging them into the ranks of the regime and liquidating their potential of fight against fascism by this way.
 

 

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The memorandum on April 27 and the polarization of the regime's forces
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The ongoing polarization of the regime's inner forces around the presidential elections reached its peak with a memorandum by the fascist generals on April 27.
In the clashes in Cankaya Palace lasting for months, the AKP 's (Party of Justice and Development-government party) delay to nominate candidates has raised tensions.
The Turkish Army, which had realized three coups so far (May 27, 1960; March 12, 1971 and September 12, 1980) and another "post modern coup" on February 28, 1997, has always claimed to be the only owner and protector of the . Since the AKP is forming the government, there have been some limited changes in the power relation between TÜSIAD and the AKP on the one hand and the army and the forces around it on the other hand. The first ones won some posts against the latter. From every point of view, the presidential elections had the meaning that this power relation, which was established between the regime's forces, was going to be reorganized. The army and its supporting forces judged the nomination of an AKP-president as a possible threat to the ruling power, and as an act which might weaken their posts and might destroy the fundamentals of the regime because of the symbolic value a president has got. The army, the main oppositional party CHP (Republican People's Party) and some other forces following the same line have put a lot of effort in keeping the AKP away from this post. Within this power struggle, the army's sword is called secularism.
These forces which on the one hand try to put pressure on the AKP by using threats, also tried to incite the masses, full of rage against the collaborating policy of the government, against the AKP government by organizing a rally on April 14 in Ankara. They were successful as they made hundreds of thousand people fill the streets.
Finally, the AKP presented its candidate. As soon as the name of Abdullah Gul, one of the top men of the AKP, was mentioned, the discussion on the question "Will there be headscarves in Cankaya from now on?" reached its peak.*
The presidential elections started in the afternoon on April 27. When the majority of 367 votes, which were necessary in the first round, could not be achieved, the elections turned into a ballot crisis: the CHP, which in this clash has been the main spokesman of the army within parliament from the beginning on, submitted a complaint to the Constitutional Court, because "a parliament session can only be opened for realizing elections when 367 deputies are present"**. The discussions around the 367 deputies had started weeks ago and the CHP complaint in a written version had been ready for days. This was the only point for them to make use of the law to hinder the AKP, which has the necessary majority of the voices to elect the president.
In the same night at 11.10pm, the General Staff published a memorandum on his homepage and presented his stance: "The problem that occurred during the presidential elections in the last days is now centralized in the discussion on secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are watching this situation with concern. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are partial in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism. The Turkish armed forces are strictly against those debates and any negative comments and will display openly and clearly its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary."
In the declaration, it also said that "the Turkish armed forces keep their ceaseless determination, which they got to fulfil their duties completely, determined by law, in order to protect these qualities. The Turkish armed forces' belief and commitment to this determination are indisputable." This statement resembles the threat of a military coup.
The AKP government, however, continues with its persisting attitude against the memorandum that it had developed from the beginning. It judged the general staff's declaration as an "intervention into the ruling" and explained that this is "unthinkable for democratic societies".
With its declaration, the army's main aim is to influence the Constitutional Court's decision to count the first round of the election held on April 27 as valid or not. In case it is counted as invalid, there will be early elections in the end of July and beginning of August. In the next two months, the General Staff might put effort into splitting and isolating the AKP and undertake steps to prevent the party from being reelected into the government by early elections. This act could also involve the persecution of different Islamic forces around the AKP. With new provocations, the army could try to polarize the working class and the masses of labourers on the basis of secularism and Sharia. However, due to the international conjuncture, the army does not seem to take more serious precautions against the AKP.
The AKP has been a product of the memorandum on February 28, 1997. In that time, after the coalition of the RP (Party of Welfare) and the DYP (True Path Party) had been expelled from the government, the RP liquidated through splitting and the AKP, a "moderate" Islamic party of the type "Project Greater Middle East" was founded. Now, the aim is to keep this party, which was a product of a previous memorandum, but has now extravagated, away from its posts achieved so far.
Whilst the polarization among the regime's inner forces became deeper, attacks on the revolutionary, democratic, progressive forces and the Kurdish people increased, too. Especially the DTP is being oppressed more than usually in order to prevent the party from entering parliament with early elections.
The progressive, revolutionary, communist forces in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan have now the duty to strengthen the united struggle under the slogan "No to putschists".

*Since 28 February 1997, wearing headscarves is no longer permitted in public areas. The headscarf has become the symbol of the polarization between Secularism and Sharia. New discussions came up came up as Abdullah Gul's wife wears a headscarf and so, a possiblity that the headscarf will move to Cankaya palace, which is a symbolic place, has appeared. The wife of the Prime Minister and of the other ministers from AKP has never been invited to receptions in Cankaya.
**The president is elected by the members of National Congress (totally 550 deputies). The presence of 184 deputies is enough for the opening of an ordinary session. However, during the presidential elections, a condition was brought forward that not 184, but 367 deputies, which form the two third of the majority have to be present.

Rallies supporting the putschists

On April 14, a rally was organized at Tandogan Square, Ankara, to support the possible application of Tayyip Erdogan. The country has rarely faced such a mass coming together. Different groups, which present themselves as anti-imperialist and left-wing, but are commonly known for provoking racism and chauvinism, such as the ADD (Association of Kemalist Thought) and the CHP, and civil fascist parties such as the MHP (National Movement Party) and BBP (Party of Great Unity) displayed a mass protest. The number of participants was more than 1 million, whereas these were not the masses of putschist, racist, fascist organizations, but the masses of labourers, who had been full of rage until then against the collaborating policies of the AKP government, its loyal slavery to USA and EU imperialists and Islamic reaction.
This rally had the aim to reduce the legitimacy of the chance that there will be an AKP-president and instead to legitimate precautions such as the memorandum on April 27, which happen whenever the AKP breaks ranks.
The rally was lead by the retired general Eruygur, president of the ADD. It became public that this pasha, follower of the US, was one the fascist generals who had made plans to realize a coup in 2004.
After this rally, which progressive forces considered as a rally supporting the putschists, another rally took place on April 29 in Istanbul and this rally was even bigger.
Two days before the rally on April 29, the memorandum mentioned above was proclaimed. Although the rally was organized under the slogan "No Sharia, no coup, but a full democratic Turkey", and started with the slogan "Long live pasha Yasar", it did not have any other meaning than a rally for the "support of the memorandum message".
The number of participants was higher than in the rally at Tandogan Square, Ankara. The trade union DISK and many other democratic mass organizations, which "officially" had not supported the rally in Ankara, joined the rally in Istanbul and therefore gave themselves the poor role they had already played at the memorandum on February 28, 1997.
Both rallies have been the last examples of the policy of organizing the labourer masses within the context of a reactionary polarization on the basis of the separations such as Turks and Kurds, secularism and islamism or Allevites and Sunnites; of dragging them into the ranks of the regime and liquidating their potential of fight against fascism by this way.