Persecution against MIT and the conflict among the cliques
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The interrogation against MIT has not developed as a result of the difference of policies concerning the Kurdish question, but through the use of the hypocritical policy on this issue by the partners of the power against each other in their internal conflicts and contradictions. The signs of these contradictions were seen before in the case of the interrogation about match-fixing activities, the retirement law, the raid against the Public Procurement Agency (KIK) and some topics of the foreign politics such as the case of Mavi Marmara and these contradictions will go on deepening further.

 

01 March 2012 /International Bulletin / Issue 114

 

 

The persecutions of KCK which has caused so far the imprisonment of 7 thousand Kurdish patriots, democrats and revolutionary people, hundreds out of them elected mayors, BDP leaders, intellectuals, and lawyers of the PKK leader Ocalan, has reached until the MIT elements who have carried out the secret negotiations with PKK, named as "Oslo negotiations".
On February 8, it turned out that the prosecutor Sadrettin Sarikaya, in charge of the political liquidation operation waged against the Kurdish freedom forces under the name of "KCK persecutions", has called the MIT undersecretary Hakan Fidan for an interrogation as a suspected, in the name of the Chief Public Presecutor's Office. The former MIT undersecretary Emre Taner and his assistant Afet Gunes and 2 more MIT elements were called within the same context. The accusation against Fidan and his team are based on the claim of malfeasance during their spy activities within PKK and during the Oslo negotiations with the PKK representatives.
Together with this incident, an intensive traffic of internal conflicts on the axis of the Police-Justice-MIT came to the centre of the political agenda of February.
The first reaction of the AKP government was defending the MIT elements through the statements of various government members such as Prime Minister Erdogan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Davudoglu who affirmed that Fidan and his team had carried out an active and successful work. Within a few days, the specially authorised prosecutor Sarikaya was relieved from the case. On the same days, the police agents charged with the KCK persecutions were discharged, too. At the same time, the government immediately set out to make a law which meant an operation to rescue the MIT elements and the draft law which was prepared quicker than hell was approved in the Congress through the votes of the AKP members. According to the law, the legal proceedings against the persons specially deployed by the Prime Minister are subjected to the permission of the Prime Minister; thus the Prime Minister is authorised for forming his own gang, and this act of law is also valid for the persecutions and interrogations that have been continuing at the moment when the law is put in force.
Together with these developments, lively discussions about what kind of a fight and which forces stand behind this incident. Some circles, especially those are close to the Fethullah Gulen Community, ascribed this incident to "some external forces having their hand in this" and to the displeasure of some MOSSAD and CIA agents, who have possibly infiltrated MIT or the Police, with the AKP policies on Syria and the region. Some others claimed that the Prime Minister Erdogan and his supporters, in the name of Hakan Fidan and his team, have the NIYET of basing on the solution of negotiations concerning the Kurdish question, and those who want to hinder this have carried out this move.
The issue seems to be really complicated at the first look: The Police and after that the Justice, since they have been taken over under the control of the government from the hands of the clique represented by the axis of Army- CHP - MHP , have functioned as an attack machine in the hands of AKP both against this clique in the internal conflict of the bourgeoisie and against the revolutionary and democratic forces, including the Kurdish national movement at the first place, in the attacks of liquidation against these forces. Today, however, this move against Erdogan is being organised through the same Justice and Police. Therefore, it does not seem to be possible to characterise the interrogation against the MIT elements as a move of the old status quo forces. Because if this move were not organised by a force having more or less influence on the Justice and the Police, if it were an individual incident resulting from the personal attitude of the prosecutor or if it were a move of resistance by the status quo forces that have a dispersed situation, this act could be suffocated, forced to be withdrawn, would not be an issue of conflict turning up to making a law at the Congress and continuing even after or it could be expected that the government launches immediate counter operations. However, these did not happen. Likewise, it is not more than a simple-minded thinking related with the illusions of bourgeois democracy concerning the AKP government to claim that the AKP government -which has waged a total war full of intensive military and political attacks including civilian massacres and use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish freedom movement right after the general elections of June 2011 - would be in favour of a negotiation-based solution of the question and the MIT elements are targeted because of this. From this point of view, all the facts point at a certain conflict between the AKP and its partners of power or supporting forces, or at least, at a struggle of share.
The Kurdish question continues to be the main element of the conflict of cliques within the bourgeoisie. AKP was founded through the division of the Party of Welfare (RP) within the context of the conflict of cliques within the bourgeoisie in the period of February 28, 1997. Likewise, the support of TUSIAD , MUSIAD, the Gulen Community etc. to AKP, after winning the elections in 2002, developed on the axis of these internal conflicts. Concerning its conflicts with the axis of the Army-CHP-MHP, the AKP carried out a fight for the political power while it was forming the government and it came to a certain point. This clique lost important posts within the police, justice, MIT and finally in the main commanding ranks of the army.
The erosion of will in face of the Kurdish freedom movement and the struggle of share rising on this base was the main axis which these conflicts of the cliques were developing on, and in return, the lack of success at liquidating the Kurdish freedom movement was the ground that determined the result of these conflicts of the cliques, by causing that the unsuccessful forces lose both their social base and the support of the bourgeoisie.
However, during the 10-year-governing of the duo of AKP-Gulen Community, the grounds of a new fight for the share of power was being laid in parallel to the success of the above mentioned struggle for the power. The contradictions between the AKP and its partners of power as well as the contradictions of these two forces with the bourgeois forces such as TUSIAD etc. and the imperialist forces such as the USA and partly the EU supporting them have not taken the form of open conflicts. Neither the contradictions are so sharpened as to be a ground for such open conflicts. However, it is seen that the interrogation against MIT is an expression of these developing contradictions.
It is wrong to expect that these contradictions are caused of a disagreement concerning the total war against the Kurdish freedom movement. The AKP government has been clear about the policy of liquidation from the very beginning. It took both the process of "Kurdish initiative" and the "Oslo negotiations" following this were as delaying tactics all the way. Thus it has silenced the expectations in favour of a negotiation-based solution of the question on the one hand, and on the other hand, by continuing the imprisonments of KCK etc., it has not totally disappointed the sectors that are in favour of the policy of "stick without carrot". It has continued this process also after the "Kurdish Initiative" and gained time until the elections, and together with the social support of % 50 that it won in the elections, it launched the process of total war through military and political operations. It is not that the AKP wants to give a step towards the negotiations and is being hindered. It is also not that Hakan Fidan and his team represents the solutionist side. The words of Erdogan evaluating Hakan Fidan's team was a confession of this, when he said: "They have fulfilled their duty in the fight against terrorism".
However, the elements for other internal conflicts within the state have been accumulated in this process. A broad sector from TUSIAD to the bourgeois liberals, who have supported the AKP government with the aim of political stability locked onto the liquidation of the solution of the Kurdish question, which means the liquidation of the freedom movement, have started to get displeased with a panorama of lack of success continuing for years. Besides, the Gulen Community continuously increases its demands for a more "fair" share. Some disagreements on foreign policy have also contributed to this panorama.
At this point, the policies of liquidation come to the agenda in another form. The AKP has played a lot of dirty games within the knowledge of its partners during the whole process of hypocritical policies that it has carried out so far through carrot on the one hand and stick on the other hand, the "Kurdish Initiative" and the Oslo negotiations on the one hand and the military and political operations on the other hand, the persecution of the counter-guerrilla and army forces within the context of the conflict of cliques on the one hand and the reorganisation of the counter-guerrilla on the other hand and committing the Roboski Massacre on the one hand and putting the discourse of apologise for the Dersim Massacre on the agenda on the other hand. Today these weak points of it get in its own way.
The interrogation against MIT has not developed as a result of the difference of policies concerning the Kurdish question, but through the use of the hypocritical policy on this issue by the partners of the power against each other in their internal conflicts and contradictions. The signs of these contradictions were seen before in the case of the interrogation about match-fixing activities, the retirement law, the raid against the Public Procurement Agency (KIK) and some topics of the foreign politics such as the case of Mavi Marmara and these contradictions will go on deepening further.
This situation is one of the facts that show that the delaying tactics of the AKP government and its opportunities to create a panorama of relative political stability through these hypocritical moves has come close to an end. Its actual insistence on total war and its aggressiveness is related to this fact. In case of failing at this move due to the resistance of the Kurdish freedom forces and a rise of the progressive, revolutionary and communist forces of the West, its dilemma will grow and the Turkish state's erosion of will in face of the Kurdish freedom movement will deepen.
 

 

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Persecution against MIT and the conflict among the cliques
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The interrogation against MIT has not developed as a result of the difference of policies concerning the Kurdish question, but through the use of the hypocritical policy on this issue by the partners of the power against each other in their internal conflicts and contradictions. The signs of these contradictions were seen before in the case of the interrogation about match-fixing activities, the retirement law, the raid against the Public Procurement Agency (KIK) and some topics of the foreign politics such as the case of Mavi Marmara and these contradictions will go on deepening further.

 

01 March 2012 /International Bulletin / Issue 114

 

 

The persecutions of KCK which has caused so far the imprisonment of 7 thousand Kurdish patriots, democrats and revolutionary people, hundreds out of them elected mayors, BDP leaders, intellectuals, and lawyers of the PKK leader Ocalan, has reached until the MIT elements who have carried out the secret negotiations with PKK, named as "Oslo negotiations".
On February 8, it turned out that the prosecutor Sadrettin Sarikaya, in charge of the political liquidation operation waged against the Kurdish freedom forces under the name of "KCK persecutions", has called the MIT undersecretary Hakan Fidan for an interrogation as a suspected, in the name of the Chief Public Presecutor's Office. The former MIT undersecretary Emre Taner and his assistant Afet Gunes and 2 more MIT elements were called within the same context. The accusation against Fidan and his team are based on the claim of malfeasance during their spy activities within PKK and during the Oslo negotiations with the PKK representatives.
Together with this incident, an intensive traffic of internal conflicts on the axis of the Police-Justice-MIT came to the centre of the political agenda of February.
The first reaction of the AKP government was defending the MIT elements through the statements of various government members such as Prime Minister Erdogan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Davudoglu who affirmed that Fidan and his team had carried out an active and successful work. Within a few days, the specially authorised prosecutor Sarikaya was relieved from the case. On the same days, the police agents charged with the KCK persecutions were discharged, too. At the same time, the government immediately set out to make a law which meant an operation to rescue the MIT elements and the draft law which was prepared quicker than hell was approved in the Congress through the votes of the AKP members. According to the law, the legal proceedings against the persons specially deployed by the Prime Minister are subjected to the permission of the Prime Minister; thus the Prime Minister is authorised for forming his own gang, and this act of law is also valid for the persecutions and interrogations that have been continuing at the moment when the law is put in force.
Together with these developments, lively discussions about what kind of a fight and which forces stand behind this incident. Some circles, especially those are close to the Fethullah Gulen Community, ascribed this incident to "some external forces having their hand in this" and to the displeasure of some MOSSAD and CIA agents, who have possibly infiltrated MIT or the Police, with the AKP policies on Syria and the region. Some others claimed that the Prime Minister Erdogan and his supporters, in the name of Hakan Fidan and his team, have the NIYET of basing on the solution of negotiations concerning the Kurdish question, and those who want to hinder this have carried out this move.
The issue seems to be really complicated at the first look: The Police and after that the Justice, since they have been taken over under the control of the government from the hands of the clique represented by the axis of Army- CHP - MHP , have functioned as an attack machine in the hands of AKP both against this clique in the internal conflict of the bourgeoisie and against the revolutionary and democratic forces, including the Kurdish national movement at the first place, in the attacks of liquidation against these forces. Today, however, this move against Erdogan is being organised through the same Justice and Police. Therefore, it does not seem to be possible to characterise the interrogation against the MIT elements as a move of the old status quo forces. Because if this move were not organised by a force having more or less influence on the Justice and the Police, if it were an individual incident resulting from the personal attitude of the prosecutor or if it were a move of resistance by the status quo forces that have a dispersed situation, this act could be suffocated, forced to be withdrawn, would not be an issue of conflict turning up to making a law at the Congress and continuing even after or it could be expected that the government launches immediate counter operations. However, these did not happen. Likewise, it is not more than a simple-minded thinking related with the illusions of bourgeois democracy concerning the AKP government to claim that the AKP government -which has waged a total war full of intensive military and political attacks including civilian massacres and use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish freedom movement right after the general elections of June 2011 - would be in favour of a negotiation-based solution of the question and the MIT elements are targeted because of this. From this point of view, all the facts point at a certain conflict between the AKP and its partners of power or supporting forces, or at least, at a struggle of share.
The Kurdish question continues to be the main element of the conflict of cliques within the bourgeoisie. AKP was founded through the division of the Party of Welfare (RP) within the context of the conflict of cliques within the bourgeoisie in the period of February 28, 1997. Likewise, the support of TUSIAD , MUSIAD, the Gulen Community etc. to AKP, after winning the elections in 2002, developed on the axis of these internal conflicts. Concerning its conflicts with the axis of the Army-CHP-MHP, the AKP carried out a fight for the political power while it was forming the government and it came to a certain point. This clique lost important posts within the police, justice, MIT and finally in the main commanding ranks of the army.
The erosion of will in face of the Kurdish freedom movement and the struggle of share rising on this base was the main axis which these conflicts of the cliques were developing on, and in return, the lack of success at liquidating the Kurdish freedom movement was the ground that determined the result of these conflicts of the cliques, by causing that the unsuccessful forces lose both their social base and the support of the bourgeoisie.
However, during the 10-year-governing of the duo of AKP-Gulen Community, the grounds of a new fight for the share of power was being laid in parallel to the success of the above mentioned struggle for the power. The contradictions between the AKP and its partners of power as well as the contradictions of these two forces with the bourgeois forces such as TUSIAD etc. and the imperialist forces such as the USA and partly the EU supporting them have not taken the form of open conflicts. Neither the contradictions are so sharpened as to be a ground for such open conflicts. However, it is seen that the interrogation against MIT is an expression of these developing contradictions.
It is wrong to expect that these contradictions are caused of a disagreement concerning the total war against the Kurdish freedom movement. The AKP government has been clear about the policy of liquidation from the very beginning. It took both the process of "Kurdish initiative" and the "Oslo negotiations" following this were as delaying tactics all the way. Thus it has silenced the expectations in favour of a negotiation-based solution of the question on the one hand, and on the other hand, by continuing the imprisonments of KCK etc., it has not totally disappointed the sectors that are in favour of the policy of "stick without carrot". It has continued this process also after the "Kurdish Initiative" and gained time until the elections, and together with the social support of % 50 that it won in the elections, it launched the process of total war through military and political operations. It is not that the AKP wants to give a step towards the negotiations and is being hindered. It is also not that Hakan Fidan and his team represents the solutionist side. The words of Erdogan evaluating Hakan Fidan's team was a confession of this, when he said: "They have fulfilled their duty in the fight against terrorism".
However, the elements for other internal conflicts within the state have been accumulated in this process. A broad sector from TUSIAD to the bourgeois liberals, who have supported the AKP government with the aim of political stability locked onto the liquidation of the solution of the Kurdish question, which means the liquidation of the freedom movement, have started to get displeased with a panorama of lack of success continuing for years. Besides, the Gulen Community continuously increases its demands for a more "fair" share. Some disagreements on foreign policy have also contributed to this panorama.
At this point, the policies of liquidation come to the agenda in another form. The AKP has played a lot of dirty games within the knowledge of its partners during the whole process of hypocritical policies that it has carried out so far through carrot on the one hand and stick on the other hand, the "Kurdish Initiative" and the Oslo negotiations on the one hand and the military and political operations on the other hand, the persecution of the counter-guerrilla and army forces within the context of the conflict of cliques on the one hand and the reorganisation of the counter-guerrilla on the other hand and committing the Roboski Massacre on the one hand and putting the discourse of apologise for the Dersim Massacre on the agenda on the other hand. Today these weak points of it get in its own way.
The interrogation against MIT has not developed as a result of the difference of policies concerning the Kurdish question, but through the use of the hypocritical policy on this issue by the partners of the power against each other in their internal conflicts and contradictions. The signs of these contradictions were seen before in the case of the interrogation about match-fixing activities, the retirement law, the raid against the Public Procurement Agency (KIK) and some topics of the foreign politics such as the case of Mavi Marmara and these contradictions will go on deepening further.
This situation is one of the facts that show that the delaying tactics of the AKP government and its opportunities to create a panorama of relative political stability through these hypocritical moves has come close to an end. Its actual insistence on total war and its aggressiveness is related to this fact. In case of failing at this move due to the resistance of the Kurdish freedom forces and a rise of the progressive, revolutionary and communist forces of the West, its dilemma will grow and the Turkish state's erosion of will in face of the Kurdish freedom movement will deepen.